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Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Peccole Ranch Cmty. Ass’n, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 52 (Sept. 23, 2021)1 
“INTERPRETATION” OF CC&Rs: WHEN PRETRIAL MEDIATION IS NECESSARY  
 
Summary 
 The Nevada Supreme Court interpreted the breadth of NRS 38.310 and its applicability to 
complaints requiring “the interpretation, application or enforcement of any covenants, conditions 
or restrictions [CC&Rs] applicable to residential property or any bylaws, rules or regulations 
adopted by an association.”2 The Court considered their decision in Hamm v. Arrowcreek 
Homeowners’ Association and determined that in order to activate the pretrial mediation 
requirement of NRS 38.310 a complaint must unambiguously require a magistrate to interpret, 
apply, or enforce the CC&Rs meaning when resolving the merits of the case.3 While embracing 
Hamm, the Court simultaneously overturned their past holding in McKnight Family, LLP v. Adept 
Management Services, Inc., which expanded the influence and usage of NRS 38.310 while it was 
in effect.4 
Facts and Procedural History 
 Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) was assigned the deed of trust to the property at issue. 
After a period of time, the homeowner of this property became delinquent on assessment fees 
owed to Peccole Ranch Community Association (“HOA”) and was served a notice of default in 
December 2011. Immediately after the homeowner was served this default notice, BANA 
tendered the amount of the required superpriority lien in order to preserve the continuing interest 
in the property and its deed of trust.5 However, the HOA rejected this offer and moved forward 
with an auction of the property. It was at this time that Saticoy Bay purchased the defaulted 
property; however, no indication was made that the property had a competing interest.  
BANA ultimately filed a quiet title complaint in federal district court in 2016 where it 
determined that their deed of trust survived the foreclosure auction, leaving Saticoy Bay with 
nothing. Saticoy sued the HOA and alleged breach of the duty of good faith, conspiracy, among 
other claims. Respondents moved to have the court dismiss the suit for noncompliance with NRS 
38.310. The district court deemed Saticoy Bay noncompliant by failing to mediate prior to filing 
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The district court’s order was a final, appealable judgment 
 Respondents first contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as it was 
dismissed without prejudice. However, the Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that 
such a dismissal without prejudice has “the practical effect… to deny the plaintiffs judicial relief’ 
until they have sought out all applicable administrative remedies.”6 Nonetheless, the Court held 
that such a dismissal – when paired with noncompliance with NRS 38.310 – constitutes an 
appealable final order. 
Determining NRS 38.310’s scope on limitation of filing civil actions 
 The Court focused on two core questions: (1) exactly how connected must a claim be to 
the CC&Rs of a residential property in order to trigger NRS 38.310’s requirements? (2) should 
the courts dismiss an entire suit if a claim merely relates to the CC&Rs, or only those claims 
barred by statute?  
 In regards to the first question, the Court analyzed their decision in Hamm and clarified 
that only those cases that strictly require interpretation, application, or enforcement of CC&Rs in 
resolving the merits of a claim fall within the purview of NRS 38.310. In that case, the plaintiffs 
explicitly asked the Court to interpret the CC&Rs in order to see if they were liable for fees to be 
paid on vacant lots.7 Since such a request requires the court to determine the meaning of the 
CC&R at issue, plaintiffs must first submit their claim to mediation before launching a civil 
action through the courts.8 
 Importantly, the Court revisited the decision made in McKnight, where they originally 
interpreted NRS 38.310 more broadly. In that case, the court determined that the multiple claims 
brought by the plaintiff were barred under the statute because they “required the district court to 
interpret regulations and statutes that contained conditions and restrictions applicable to 
residential property.”9 The Court held that McKnight incorrectly extended the scope of NRS 
38.310; the language “covenants, conditions, or restrictions” was improperly understood to mean 
all conditions and restrictions on property, no matter where they’re derived from. “Covenants, 
conditions, or restrictions” is a term of art. For the purposes of NRS 38.310, the phrase applies to 
those rules contained in an HOA’s recorded declaration or deed.10 
 NRS 38.310’s principal function is to prevent Nevada courts from inserting themselves 
into CC&R disputes before such disagreements have had the chance to be resolved through 
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mediation. The Court held, therefore, that those disputes in which the facts surrounding the 
complaint merely involve the interpretation, application, or enforcement of CC&Rs – rather than 
require – do not relate to the CC&Rs for the purposes of NRS 38.310. 
 As for the second question, the Court held that a district court is only required to dismiss 
those claims that fail to comply with the statute; any remaining claims may be allowed to 
proceed to through the court unaffected.  
The district court erred in dismissing Saticoy Bay’s action 
 Given that the Court rejected the broad interpretation of NRS 38.310 used in McKnight, 
the Court declines to implicate the statute in the present action, as none of Saticoy Bay’s claims 
required the district court to interpret, apply, or enforce the CC&Rs at issue. 
 Saticoy Bay first alleged a claim of misrepresentation on the part of the HOA for failing 
to disclose that BANA had attempted to tender the superpriority lien prior to the auction. The 
Court accepts that the sale occurred because the original homeowner failed to pay HOA fees, 
which are explicitly mentioned and required in the HOA’s CC&Rs. However, this merely 
established that the claim’s factual background involved the CC&Rs; nothing in the facts 
demanded that the Court interpret, apply, or enforce the terms of the CC&Rs. The basis of the 
misrepresentation claim hinges on an allegation of breached duty. Such a duty originates in 
common law, not the CC&Rs. 
 Saticoy Bay’s second claim centered on the HOA’s breach of the duty of good faith. Like 
the first claim, this too is based on an element of nondisclosure which would not require a 
magistrate to analyze the CC&Rs at issue. Respondents insist that McKnight supports the 
contention that this claim was properly dismissed under NRS 38.310, but the Court took issue 
with this assertion for two reasons: (1) the breach in McKnight challenged the authority of the 
CC&Rs (2) McKnight incorrectly stated that the breach-of-good-faith itself was a condition or 
restriction on residential property as described in NRS 38.310(1)(a). 
 Saticoy Bay’s third claim alleged conspiracy, stating that the HOA and its trustee 
conspired to commit the wrongs outlined in the prior two claims. Just as the other claims do not 
require the Court to look at the CC&Rs to decide the merits of the case, this third claim is 
likewise unrelated to interpreting, applying, or enforcing any part of the CC&R. As such, the 
statute is inapplicable to this claim. 
 The last claim made by petitioners alleged that NRS Chapter 113 applied to HOA 
foreclosure sale disclosures. Just like the first three claims, the Court again failed to see any 
explicit connection between this particular claim and the language of NRS 38.310 which would 






 The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that none of the claims alleged by Saticoy Bay fell 
under the umbrella of NRS 38.310. Because of this, the district court erred in dismissing the 
claim on those grounds. The Court noted that magistrates should make a determination into 
whether the merits of a particular case would necessitate interpreting, applying, or enforcing 
CC&Rs or association rules. If a complaint is duly dismissed under NRS 38.310 without 
prejudice, said complaint is eligible for appeal. In the present case, the Court reverses the district 
court’s order and remands for consideration of other rationales for dismissal in respondents’ 
motion. 
